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Abstract: The public interest in the administration of justice requires access to 
justice for all.  But access to justice must be “meaningful” access. Meaningful access 
requires procedures, processes, and institutional structures that facilitate 
communication among participants and decision-makers and ensure that judges and 
other decision-makers have the resources they need to render fully informed and 
sound decisions. Working from that premise, which is based on a reconceptualization 
of the objectives and methods of the justice process, the author proposes numerous 
specific changes in decision-making processes and practices. These changes are 
required to achieve a standard of decision-making that is consistent with the public 
interest in the administration of justice within a constitutional framework under the 
social and political conditions of the early 21st century. The essay illustrates the 
application of the principles and methods of "legitecture" to the analysis of problems 
of institutional design in law. 
 
 
… justice and the just society… is essential to 
flourishing of men, women and children and to 
maintaining social stability and security.1 
   
        
INTRODUCTION 
 
The public interest in the administration of justice requires that everyone have access 
to justice. Access to justice must be “meaningful” access. Meaningful access 
mandates procedures, processes, and institutional structures that provide judges and 
other decision-makers with the resources they require to render fully informed and 
sound decisions. This essay argues that changes in the judicial process are needed to 
meet that objective at a standard that is consistent with the public interest in the 
administration of justice within a constitutional framework under contemporary 
social and political conditions.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*Professor, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada; B.A (Bryn Mawr), M.A., Ph.D. (McGill), 
J.D. (Queen’s – Kingston, Ont.), LL.M. (Yale Law School).   
1 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, PC, Chief Justice of Canada, Address (Remarks delivered at 
the Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, 8 March 2007), [unpublished] [McLachlin]. 
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What makes access to justice meaningful? 
 
The core purpose of access to justice is to ensure that all those who require the 
assistance of the legal system obtain it. Access to justice requires full and effective 
communication between agents and representatives of the legal system and all those 
who use its services. In matters before the courts, the core functions served by the 
judicial process are those of hearing and being heard. To have effective and 
meaningful access to justice, the parties must be heard. Cases do not decide 
themselves; judges do. To decide a case, a judge must hear and understand the case.  
Judges are not seers, oracles, or mind-readers. Cases need to be presented in a 
manner that can be fully understood by the judge who is required to make a decision 
based on the evidence and the law. This requirement extends to all the evidence 
adduced and all argumentation. Whether an action requires the judge to clarify legal 
rights, rule on an application, or resolve a dispute, practices and procedures that tend 
to limit or frustrate effective communication will also tend to have the effect of 
limiting meaningful access to justice. One or more of the parties to the process will 
be silenced, not have the direction they require, or fail to realize that additional steps 
need to be taken to place necessary information and perspectives before the court to 
ensure their evidence and submissions are understood.    
 
 
         Adjudicating in the contemporary context entails challenging 
responsibilities. Some of these challenges are due to social and cultural 
heterogeneity. Others flow from the complexity of the issues or specialized technical 
nature of some evidence. Diversity on the bench serves important social and political 
purposes and contributes to enriching judicial perspectives and the exchange of 
views among judges about emerging issues and the role of the judiciary.2 But a 
diverse bench does not and cannot, for obvious practical reasons, ensure that the 
judge or judges presiding in any given case will have either the life experience and 
requisite social and cultural awareness and understanding or the technical 
background required to produce a well-grounded and soundly-reasoned decision. 
Judges must not only understand the evidence and the social and cultural significance 
of the issues that arise in the context of specific cases, but also need to appreciate the 
implications of their decisions for those affected, both the parties and other persons 
whose interests may be affected. In the increasingly diverse and complex social and 
                                                 
2 R v S (RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484 stimulated wide discussion among Canadian jurists and academics about 
diversity on the bench. A representative sample includes: Richard Devlin, A Wayne MacKay & Natasha 
Kim, “Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or towards 
a Triple P Judiciary” (2000) 38 Alberta Law Review 734; Sonia N Lawrence, “Cultural (in)Sensitivity: 
The Dangers of a Simplistic Approach to Culture in the Courtroom” (2001) 13 Can J Women & L 107; 
Richard F Devlin & Dianne Pothier, “Redressing the Imbalances: Rethinking the Judicial Role After R v 
RDS (1999-2000) 31 Ottawa L Rev 1; Christine Boyle et al,  “R v RDS: An Editor's Forum” (1998) 10 
Can J Women & L 159; Maryka Omatsu, “The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality” 9 (1997) Can J Women & 
L 1. 
  
20
12
 C
an
LI
ID
oc
s 
60
[2012] ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127 
 
 
political context of contemporary Canada, there may often be a gap between the level 
of judicial comprehension required to afford the parties meaningful access to the 
justice process, and the level of understanding any individual judge or panel of 
judges can single-handedly achieve within the current framework of judicial 
procedures and practices. In particular, any individual judge on the bench may often 
not have personal experience of issues that are crucial in a specific case or may not 
understand the cultural background or perspective of the parties.   
 
 
 This problem is not new, of course; this has arguably always been the case, 
although it has not always been recognized. But we now have a better appreciation of 
the complexities of decision-making and the resultant vulnerability of judges to 
misunderstanding and error in the face of differences in life experience, cultural 
background and socialization. And we recognize that law operates in a complex 
environment of competing social, cultural, and political values and must be 
interpreted and applied in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution.  
Mechanical formalist jurisprudence is now largely an artifact of the past; meanwhile 
the central elements of judicial process remain much the same as they have been for 
decades, even though they may not always be fully adequate to the challenges posed 
by many cases before the courts.  All of these considerations in combination point to 
the conclusion that it is time to re-examine the judicial process to ensure that the 
procedures and practices used are tools that are effective to facilitate doing justice 
pursuant to the rule of law.   
 
 
 This essay postulates that the public interest in the administration of justice 
requires meaningful access to justice for all, not just for some. This is beyond 
question. It is in the collective public interest that all persons in Canada, as 
individuals and members of diverse groups, be able, when and to the extent they 
choose, to utilize the legal system to secure the benefits and protections to which 
they are entitled by law and to resolve any disputes they may have either with one 
another or with the government. This objective, in turn, mandates that judges be 
provided with the resources and assistance they need to render sound decisions in the 
cases they hear and decide. Indeed the responsibility to decide must be seen to entail 
judicial entitlement to the resources required to make sound decisions. Otherwise, 
the judiciary is placed in an untenable position and the administration of justice 
inevitably suffers a loss of integrity. Therefore, any modifications in the judicial 
process that may be necessary to ensure that the public interest in the administration 
of justice is well-served must be made.   
 
 
 This essay proposes a number of specific measures related to the handling 
of cases by the courts. The measures discussed here are not exhaustive of those that 
should be considered but do include a number of measures that are essential to assist 
judges in addressing the challenges posed by the cases they hear and must decide. 
Although the scope of the discussion in this essay is limited primarily to matters 
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before the courts in non-criminal cases, with particular attention to issues related to 
meaningful communication, full comprehension, and sensitive and informed 
interpretation in the face of experiential, social, cultural, and linguistic diversity, the 
further intent is to stimulate reflection about procedure and practice in the legal 
system overall. Practices and procedures that tend to diminish or undermine rather 
than enhance the quality of the administration of justice need to be identified and 
changed. The public interest demands no less. Justice must be administered in 
accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. Failure or refusal to make the 
changes in legal processes that are required to enable judges and other decision-
makers to do justice according to law is not an option for Canadians.   
 
 
Legal representation 
  
(A) Legal representation in judicial proceedings 
 
Judges prefer that parties appearing before them have legal representation. The 
difficulties judges experience when presiding in a case involving one or more 
unrepresented parties are well-known and have been discussed at length by others.3 
Similarly, the parties to judicial proceedings ordinarily prefer to be represented by 
legal counsel but increasingly find that option unaffordable. The issues related to the 
provision of legal aid and the development of funding mechanisms to ensure that 
individuals and groups will be able to afford legal representation have been carefully 
analysed in the literature, discussed, and debated on more than one occasion.4 One 
                                                 
3 John Schofield, “Self representation in court common nuisance” The Lawyers Weekly, 31:15 (26 August 
2011); Jeremy Hainsworth, “Court resources shift to unrepresented litigants Supreme Court of BC Chief 
Justice says bumped trials may come” The Lawyers Weekly, 31:1 (6 May 2011); Philip Slayton, “Top 
Court Tales: The self-representation problem” Canadian Lawyer (January 2008); Canada, Canadian 
Judicial Council, Access to Justice:  Report on Selected Reform Initiatives in Canada, (Sub-Committee on 
Access to Justice (Trial Courts) of the Administration of Justice Committee, June 2008) at 24 [Selected 
Reform Initiatives]; Saskatchewan, Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, Unrepresented Litigants 
Access to Justice Committee, Final Report, (Unrepresented Litigants Access to Justice Committee, 
November 2007) at 45; and McLachlin, supra note 1 and accompanying text.    
4 Clayton Ruby, “A proposal for improving access to justice”, The Lawyers Weekly, 31:24 (28 October 
2011); Adam Dodek, “Articling and Access to Justice: Ontario Legal Corps---Why not?”, Slaw, (25 
October 2011) online: Slaw.ca <http://www.slaw.ca>; Melina Buckley, Moving Forward on Legal Aid: 
Research on Needs and Innovative Approaches, (Report for the Canadian Bar Association, June 2010); 
Principal Researcher, Lorne Sossin, Listening to Ontarians: Report of the Ontario Civil Legal Needs 
Project (OCLNP Steering Committee, May 2010) online: 
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/may3110_oclnreport_final.pdf> [OCLNP]; Ontario, Attorney General of 
Ontario, Report of the Legal Aid Review 2008 (University of Toronto, 2008) (Prepared by Michael 
Trebilcock) [Trebilcock]; Canadian Bar Association, Canada’s Crisis in Access to Justice (Submission to 
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the occasion of the 
consideration of its review of Canada’s Fourth and Fifth Reports on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, April 2006), online: 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/06-61-eng.pdf> [Crisis in Access]; Vicki Schmolka, Making 
the Case: Right to Publicly-Funded Legal Representation in Canada (Prepared for the Canadian Bar 
Association, February 2002); Lisa Addario, Getting a Foot in the Door: Women, Civil Legal Aid and 
Access to Justice (Prepared for the National Association of Women and the Law, 1998). 
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commonly expressed concern is that the lack of legal representation places 
unrepresented parties at a disadvantage in the adversarial process. The result is real 
and apprehended inequality in the judicial process and a consequential detrimental 
impact on interests of the unrepresented party. Persons who are not parties to the 
action may also be directly and indirectly affected. The specific outcome in a case 
may affect their interests, the ruling in the case may entail reinterpretation of a law of 
general applicability and affect them because they are similarly situated, or the case 
may be relied on as a case precedent in a subsequent case to which they are a party. 
Thus, the effects of lack of representation of one or more parties in one case may 
have a broad societal impact. Moreover, where the members of an identifiable group 
in Canadian society are disproportionately unrepresented or under-represented before 
the courts, laws regulating activities and issues affecting members of that group will 
often be interpreted and applied without the benefit of rigorous analysis in an 
adversarial process. This appears to describe the circumstances of a number of 
identifiable groups in Canada, is contrary to the collective public interest, and raises 
equality issues under s. 15 of the Charter and international human rights conventions. 
The failure of government to ensure that adequate legal aid or other forms of legal 
representation are available to women, children, aboriginal persons, and members of 
other vulnerable groups in Canada for the purpose of protecting and enforcing their 
legal rights continues to be the subject of negative comment by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.5           
  
 
 Rather than focusing on the adverse effects of lack of legal representation 
for the interests of the individual parties in an adversarial system, this essay 
examines how the lack of legal representation for one or more parties to legal 
proceedings affects the legal process, legal deliberation and the decision. The focus 
is on the quality of justice rendered in the legal system. The comparative advantage 
or disadvantage that legal representation confers on individual partisans in an 
adversarial system is acknowledged, but the analysis focuses on the quality of the 
decision-making achieved in the legal process and the impact on the collective public 
interest in the administration of justice, not on arguments about equality or 
competitive advantage between individuals, as such. The focus is not on “fair fights” 
or “level playing fields,” but on identifying the prerequisites of adequate decision-
making processes as a means to ensure that the legal process leads to well-grounded, 
well-reasoned decisions. “Equality of arms”, as such, does not guarantee either 
adequate advocacy or sound decisions. The argument here is instead that: 1) legal 
representation and advocacy on behalf of parties to a legal process is ordinarily 
necessary to ensure that the judge, or other adjudicator or decision-maker, has access 
to the full range of information, perspectives, alternate interpretations, and other 
resources required to render informed, well-reasoned decisions; and 2) the quality of 
the deliberation and decision-making that takes place in legal proceedings, of any 
                                                 
5 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UNCEDAW, 42d session, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/7, (2008) at paras 21 & 22. 
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type, is the ultimate measure of whether the public interest in the administration of 
justice is well-served. 
 
 
 In the case of court proceedings, full and effective participation by all the 
parties is one of the most effective means available to ensure that a presiding judge 
will have an opportunity to hear the entire range of perspectives and views that have 
a bearing on the issues and an opportunity to ask for clarification of submissions, as 
needed. This is most reliably achieved where the parties are represented by counsel 
and it is not difficult to identify the objectives competent advocacy serves. 
 
 
 As a consequence of the presentation of the diversity of perspectives and 
views bearing on the issue to be decided--whether it involves application 
of a rule or law and policy-making functions, the decision-maker will 
ordinarily acquire some or all of the resources required to form a 
deliberate, informed, and conscious view and to that same extent will be 
able to make a decision that is less subject to influence by unconscious 
partiality and any biases and preconceptions that he or she brought to the 
proceedings.6 
 
 
Bias, partiality, and preconceptions are matters of grave concern for the 
conscientious judge. She recognizes that her socialization, language, culture, and life 
experience shape her perceptions and reasoning process. The parties appearing 
before her often have knowledge and experience of subjects and issues that are 
unknown to her. She realizes she must be cautious when making inferences and 
drawing conclusions from the evidence. She knows that it is easy to make 
assumptions that are incorrect and rely on generalizations that lack validity without 
even realizing that one has done so. She is also aware that many biases that could 
influence fact-finding and legal reasoning are to some extent unconscious.7 Like any 
judge, she strives to be impartial. But she can only be confident that her decisions are 
well-grounded and soundly-reasoned if the hearing process is conducted in a manner 
that permits her to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the evidence and the 
issues in the case. When one or more parties lack legal representation, it is ordinarily 
                                                 
6 Lucinda Vandervort, Legitecture---the theory and practice of institutional legal design: ‘Like Lear, every 
decision-maker needs a Fool!’ (6 October 2011) 1-21 at 15 [unpublished, archived with 
author][Vandervort]. 
7 Cognitions, whether explicit and conscious or implicit and unconscious, are based on the schema and 
maps we use to organize our experience; to identify, categorize, and analyze or assess things, behaviour, 
and other people. The term “implicit bias” refers to unconscious biases in attitude (evaluative/ judgmental) 
or belief (stereotypes). Biases of which we are conscious are “explicit biases.” For a brief introduction to 
implicit bias and a topical bibliography, see Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer for the Courts, (Prepared 
for the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s State Courts, August, 
2009) available on the National Centre for State Courts online at http://ncsc.org: < 
http://wp.jerrykang.net.s110363.gridserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/kang-Implicit-Bias-Primer-
for-courts-09.pdf >. 
20
12
 C
an
LI
ID
oc
s 
60
[2012] ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 131 
 
 
impossible to be confident that all essential aspects of the case have been adequately 
presented. That undermines the integrity of the judicial process and places the judge 
in an untenable position. The image of Justice wearing a blind-fold assumes a new 
and twisted, ironic meaning. 
 
…[I]f decision-makers are to have a well-grounded confidence that their 
decisions are valid even though they will inevitably bring implicit biases 
to the decision-making process, they need access to thorough education on 
the issues and the contexts in which such issues typically arise. 
Proceedings may often need to serve educational functions; this has 
implications for the conduct of legal proceedings and for the 
administration of the judicial system.8  
 
 
The public interest requires judicial decisions to be informed, well-grounded 
on evidence, and soundly-reasoned. Insofar as lack of competent 
representation undermines attainment of this objective, the overall quality of 
decision-making is lower.   
 
 
That is contrary to the public interest in the establishment and 
maintenance of a system for the administration of justice that functions 
and is seen to function, in a manner consistent with the rule of law. The 
harm to the administration of justice and the public interest is separate and 
distinct from any harm to the personal interests of the unrepresented party 
or parties.9 
 
 
(B) Legal advice should not be contingent on the filing of an action or 
application 
 
One measure of whether a legal system functions well is its success in resolving legal 
questions and potential disputes long before recourse to the courts becomes 
necessary. Significant resources can be saved through advance planning that 
maximizes dispute avoidance. This is widely appreciated in the business community 
and the same rule of thumb applies generally. But the average person can only enjoy 
these benefits if legal information and advice is available in a form that can be 
understood and is readily accessible through service delivery mechanisms in the 
community. This is an issue that has been discussed well and at length by others.10 
 
 
                                                 
8 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 15. 
9 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 16. 
10 Selected Reform Initiatives, supra note 3 at 10-12 on point of entry assistance; Trebilcock, supra note 4 
at 80-108; OCLNP, supra note 4, passim. 
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 We all benefit when members of the community have an opportunity to 
organize their affairs in a manner that protects their interests and the interests of their 
families without recourse to legal action. It is not in the collective interest for the 
limited resources (e.g., time, money, attention, or other resources) of members of the 
community to be diverted into the prosecution or defence of legal actions, especially 
when the need for formal proceedings could have been easily avoided by the 
dissemination of legal information, advice and planning. Some individuals and 
groups who lack ready and affordable access to legal information and legal services 
use informal, traditional, and community-based approaches to organize their affairs, 
and resolve disputes and claims within their social circle or cultural group.11 When 
such arrangements prove inadequate or fail to provide adequate protection for 
Charter-protected rights and freedoms, affected parties need to have the option of 
recourse to the legal system and the assistance it may be able to provide. At present, 
some people just ‘give up’.12 
 
 
 Legal advice in advance of formal legal proceedings is also essential insofar 
as the choices a party makes in the pre-hearing or pre-trial period may affect the 
outcome. Examples include the collection and preservation of evidence, and 
decisions and actions that may prove prejudicial for the rights or interest of a party.     
 
 
  When legal representation is limited to the submission and hearing stages 
of proceedings and does not include the pre-hearing, investigation, and 
case development stages, some parties will participate in legal proceedings 
without an adequate understanding of the issues or a meaningful 
opportunity to take steps and make choices in the period prior to 
commencement of the proceedings to advance or protect their interests or 
to collect, preserve, and analyze relevant evidence.13  
 
Consider, for example, the potential impact of lack of access to legal 
representation and advice in the pre-hearing phase for a mother whose children are 
subject to a state custody or guardianship application. In JG14 the Minister of Health 
and Community Services of New Brunswick sought to extend an order granting the 
Minister custody of the appellant’s three children for an additional six months. The 
appellant had applied for legal aid and been refused pursuant to provincial policy in 
                                                 
11 OCLNP, supra note 4, at 27 reported that their research indicated that such alternate forms of assistance 
appear to be most often used by “vulnerable persons” although the empirical data on this issue was too 
limited to provide a basis for reliable conclusions. 
12 OCLNP, supra note 4, at 21 reported that 14% of respondents stated that they had had a civil legal 
problem within the previous 3 years for which they sought no assistance. 
13 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 16. 
14 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46. 
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force at the time of her application. In the majority judgment on the appeal Chief 
Justice Lamer stated:     
 
 
    I have concluded that the Government of New Brunswick was under 
a constitutional obligation to provide the appellant with state-funded 
counsel in the particular circumstances of this case. When government 
action triggers a hearing in which the interests protected by s. 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are engaged, it is under an 
obligation to do whatever is required to ensure that the hearing be fair. In 
some circumstances, depending on the seriousness of the interests at stake, 
the complexity of the proceedings, and the capacities of the parent, the 
government may be required to provide an indigent parent with state-
funded counsel. Where the government fails to discharge its constitutional 
obligation, a judge has the power to order the government to provide a 
parent with state-funded counsel under s. 24(1) of the Charter through 
whatever means the government wishes, be it through the Attorney 
General’s budget, the consolidated funds of the province, or the budget of 
the legal aid system, if one is in place.15 
 
 
 In concurring reasons authored for herself, Gonthier, and McLachlin JJ, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J observed that:  
 
 
…it is likely that the situations in which counsel will be required will not 
necessarily be rare. Proceedings will in many cases be complex, and the 
consequences, when the child may be removed from the home, are 
generally serious. Funded counsel must be ordered whenever a fair 
hearing will not take place without representation. The determination of 
this question must take into account the important value of meaningful 
participation in the hearing, taking into account the rights affected, and the 
powerlessness that a reasonable person in the position of the claimant may 
legitimately feel when faced with the formal procedures and practices of 
the justice system. The trial judge’s duty to ensure a fair trial may 
therefore, when necessary, involve an order that the parent be provided 
with legal counsel, and trial judges should not, in my view, consider the 
issue from the starting point that counsel will be necessary to ensure a fair 
hearing only in rare cases.16 
 
 
 Lamer CJC contemplated that requests for state-funded representation 
would be considered on a case-by-case basis.17 But in the context of an application 
                                                 
15 Ibid at para 2.   
16 Ibid at para 125.  
17 Following the decision in JG, the various provinces amended their legal aid policies to ensure that in the 
future legal aid applicants would be eligible, subject to the usual means tests, for funded legal 
representation for the purpose of defending their parental custodial rights against the state. 
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by the state for custody, representation at the hearing itself is arguably too little, too 
late. Even when an adjournment is ordered to permit the parent time to obtain and 
instruct counsel, by the time of the date scheduled for the hearing, the opportunity to 
make crucial choices and take critical steps is already lost. Evidence that could have 
been collected and preserved may be lost and members of the family unit will likely 
have been questioned on a number of occasions without the benefit of legal advice or 
assistance. Preparation for proper cross-examination of state witnesses requires 
discovery of notes and discussions with family members to determine whether the 
notes appear to be accurate and complete. Time may be required for consultation 
with service providers and expert witnesses. There may be issues related to culture, 
religion, child development, family structure, or medical and employment history 
that need to be researched and discussed with the client. The cultural significance of 
events or relationships, etc., may affect interpretation of the law and the evidence in 
some material respect and change the manner in which key aspects of the case might 
be understood and handled by the presiding judge. Thus, although recognition of a 
right to state-funded counsel at the custody hearing is significant, it may not fully 
address the need for legal assistance and representation in the period prior to the 
hearing or even necessarily allow counsel sufficient notice to prepare adequately for 
the hearing. 
 
 
 In an indeterminate number of cases, ready access to legal representation, 
advice, and appropriate referrals to community-based services for the mother and her 
children early on, perhaps even before there is a potential “case” to be considered, 
could lead to resolutions that support the well-being of family members and the 
stability of the family unit without a custody application ever being contemplated or 
brought by the state. Here, as in the civil, family, and administrative context overall, 
legal advice and services that have the potential to eliminate any need for formal 
legal proceedings will generally be of significant value to individuals, families, and 
the community.18 
 
 
 In the event that a case proceeds and is formally heard, the quality of the 
evidence adduced and the submissions made will probably be higher in a custody 
case if the custodial parent had legal assistance and advice well before the hearing 
stage, preferably with continuity in the service provided. This should be of assistance 
to the judge or other decision-maker who presides over the hearing and must decide 
                                                 
18 Trebilcock, OCLNP, and Crisis in Access, all supra note 4, discuss the disruptive effect unresolved 
legal problems have on the lives of individuals and families; it is widely recognized that an unresolved 
problem, especially for a person who is already vulnerable, can “cascade” into an entire series of related 
legal and non-legal problems of ill-health, disrupted family life, loss of employment, poverty, 
homelessness, etc. Those who are not vulnerable or socially marginalized at the outset may become less 
resilient under the stress of their legal problems, develop other problems not previously experienced, and 
become less and less capable of addressing any issues effectively. Failure to fund basic legal services for 
those who cannot otherwise afford them is arguably a false economy, ‘a penny wise, pound foolish’ 
approach. 
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the case. Judges likely prefer that a custodial parent be assisted at the hearing by 
counsel who not only knows the file but has had an adequate opportunity to research 
and analyse the evidence and the issues as they arise in the unique circumstances of 
the case. To deny a presiding judge the benefit of having the parents’ response to the 
application presented by counsel who is familiar with the evidence, the issues, and 
the personalities and perspectives in the case, not simply a copy of the state’s 
application and supporting documentation, such as it may be, is hardly a recipe for 
well-informed and sound decision-making. There can be no real question where the 
public interest lies in such instances.  Similar considerations arise in most other 
contexts in which a decision must be made by a judge or an administrator. Formal 
legal decisions should be decisions that are correct in law and factually accurate. 
Judges require and should have the assistance of counsel who has had adequate time 
and resources to become well-informed about the case and prepare for the hearing. 
 
 
 All aspects of the legal system are publicly funded in Canada, except legal 
representation for parties. Only government and persons for whom publicly funded 
representation is ordered by a judge or provided pursuant to legal aid regulations are 
represented at the public expense. This is an anomaly that needs to be addressed and 
remedied. To fail to do so only guarantees that judges and other decision-makers will 
often not have the assistance that they require from counsel and, as a direct 
consequence, the legal system will continue to fail to achieve the uniformly high 
standards of performance in the administration of justice that are required of it and 
that it could and should attain. This state of affairs is contrary to the public interest.19 
But legal representation is not the only factor that affects meaningful access and the 
quality of the administration of justice. 
                                                 
19 Many discussions about legal aid focus on cost, in particular: 1) legal fees; and 2) the financial burden 
an expansion of services will impose on taxpayers. The evidence suggests, however, that the net cost to 
the public purse may be more modest than anticipated and may also generate public revenue savings due 
to reductions in costs in the categories of health care and hospitalization, unemployment, welfare, family 
dysfunction, crime, and corrections. See Evelyn L Forget, “The Town with No Poverty: The Health 
Effects of a Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income Field Experiment” (2011) 37:3 Canadian Public Policy 
283 at 283: “An 8.5 percent reduction in the hospitalization rate for participants relative to controls, 
particularly for accidents and injuries and mental health. …[P]articipant contacts with physicians declined, 
especially for mental health, and…more adolescents continued into grade 12. We found no increase in 
fertility, family dissolution rates, or improved birth outcomes. We conclude that a relatively modest GAI 
can improve population health, suggesting significant health system savings”.   
 It would be useful to have similar Canadian data from controlled studies of the overall net 
impact of Access to Justice models on the public purse, including items such as increased public revenue 
from consumer spending and income tax. The increased revenues that would flow into public coffers due 
to higher levels of participation in the workforce and increased consumer activity appear to be generally 
overlooked in discussions of the costs of publicly-funded legal aid. Measures that reduce the disruption of 
individual and family lives and the stress caused by unresolved legal problems likely enhance overall 
social well-being, especially where the service delivery model includes ample measures to prevent legal 
problems and resolve incipient disputes before they become disruptive. A community that enjoys a higher 
overall level of well-being is likely to have lower costs in all areas associated with ill-health and 
dysfunction of all types. It is conceivable that a universal system of publicly-funded legal services might 
well result in a significant reduction in the per capita requirements for beds in prisons, hospitals, and 
mental health facilities in Canada. 
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Findings of fact 
 
Accurate fact-finding is essential for sound decision-making. Steps that tend to 
increase the accuracy of fact-finding should be identified, adopted, and incorporated 
into legal processes, both in the courts and in administrative settings. 
 
 
(A) Draft findings of fact 
 
Judges and other decision-makers are sometimes mistaken about the facts. 
Sometimes this has no impact on the outcome, sometimes it does. Sometimes the 
mistake is trivial, sometimes it is significant. Mistakes that do not appear to affect the 
outcome directly may nonetheless influence the judge’s opinion on key issues. 
Erroneous and misleading assertions and omissions of fact and factual inference in 
the reasons for decision can also have secondary effects after the litigation is 
concluded. Errors may be due to misperception of the evidence, flawed reasoning 
about the evidence, sketchy note-taking, or simply lack of time for careful reflection, 
but an error is an error whatever the cause may be. 
  
 
It is not uncommon for decision-makers to arrive at findings of fact that 
include errors and omissions and conclusions of fact that are not based on 
the evidence. Bare beliefs, assumptions, and unverified generalizations are 
sometimes relied on in the process of making the inferences typically 
required to arrive at findings of fact. As a consequence, some decisions are 
based on inferences that have no demonstrably valid evidentiary 
foundation and are therefore indefensible.20 
 
 
Factual errors undermine the actual and apprehended legitimacy of the 
judicial process; the impact of factual errors on the quality of justice rendered by the 
judicial process should not be under-estimated or disregarded. Judges, it is 
suggested, will welcome the introduction of measures that could be of assistance to 
them in avoiding factual errors and omissions. 
 
 
Release of draft findings of fact that explain the reasoning used to arrive at 
specific conclusions of fact serves two objectives: 1) the process of 
drafting written reasons for findings of fact requires the decision-maker to 
direct her mind to critical analysis of her own reasoning process; and 2) 
release of draft findings of fact permits the parties to assist the decision-
maker to become aware of weaknesses in her reasoning. The latter may 
range from failure to appreciate the significance of the evidence, to errors 
in deductive inference, to reliance on one or more invalid or untested 
                                                 
20 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 16. 
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beliefs or empirical generalizations, to failure to consider alternate 
perspectives on the evidence.21 
 
 
The parties will often be able to identify errors of fact that are due to 
misperception of the evidence or flaws in reasoning. There is no obvious reason, 
other than past practice, why the parties and their counsel should not have an 
opportunity to critique draft or provisional findings of fact issued by the judge before 
the reasons for decision are finalized. 
 
 
The overall quality of decisions rendered is higher when the parties to 
legal proceedings are afforded an opportunity to review and comment on 
draft findings of fact before the findings of fact are finalized.22 
 
 
In some cases this process could lead the parties to adopt supplementary joint 
statements of fact. In other cases the judge might choose to reconsider certain 
findings of fact on the basis of points raised by the parties. 
 
 
(B) Receipt of further written submissions from the parties 
 
When the parties find errors and omissions in the draft findings of fact it will 
generally be most efficient for the parties to prepare, exchange, and file written 
submissions dealing with these matters. A second round of submissions commenting 
on the critiques prepared by the other parties should be permitted. In many cases the 
judge may not require further assistance from parties following the exchange of the 
written submissions critiquing the draft findings of fact.  The additional time and 
resources required to exchange submissions is fully justified by the goal of sound 
decision-making. 
  
 
(C) Hearing with oral submissions and argument to assist judge in finalizing the 
 findings of fact 
 
Either the judge or the parties might take the position that a hearing is needed to 
permit argument with respect to certain issues or to permit further evidence to be 
adduced to clarify key facts. A judge who determines that a hearing for either or both 
purposes would be of assistance to her in finalizing the findings of fact should not 
hesitate to hold the hearing. The judge could recall key witnesses and call witnesses 
not previously called by either party, as necessary, without the case for any party 
                                                 
21 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 16-17. 
22 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 16. 
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being re-opened. This utilizes the current though rarely used power of a judge to call 
witnesses whose testimony is required although no party has sought to call them.23 In 
many cases, further evidence will be unnecessary and the hearing will consist of 
dialogue between the judge and counsel for the parties about competing 
interpretations of the evidence on the record. 
Reasons for decision 
  
The argument for the release of draft reasons for decision is similar to that for release 
of draft findings of fact. 
 
 
(A) Draft reasons for decision 
 
The process of preparing draft reasons for decision: 
  
 
…helps to ensure that the legal norms (principles, rules, policy) that 
provide the basis for the decision are identified and the reasoning process 
relied on to arrive at the decision is articulated in explicit terms.24   
 
 
Release of draft reasons makes it possible for the parties and their counsel to submit 
critical comments on the draft reasons that may be of assistance to the judge in 
drafting the final version of the decision. In drafting the reasons for decision the 
judge may find it necessary to make additional findings of fact not previously made 
and released in draft form. 
 
 
(B) Exchange of further written submissions by the parties 
  
Written submissions critiquing the draft reasons would identify errors, omissions, 
alleged misconceptions, and flawed reasoning and, where appropriate, might include 
observations about the collateral effects of the draft decision on non-parties. At this 
stage, in cases where the decision has the potential to change the law by re-
interpretation, submissions from interveners on behalf of interested non-parties may 
be useful to the judge and should be considered. These proposals are all based on the 
premise that dialogue between the judge and counsel for the parties and any 
interveners will often assist the judge in drafting reasons that are clearer, more 
                                                 
23 This may be seen as a step along the “continuum” (Cf. Selected Reform Initiatives, supra note 3 at 20) 
towards a hybrid adversarial-inquisitorial system. Insofar as it serves to ensure that the case has an 
adequate evidentiary base, and cross-examination by the parties is permitted, it is hardly inappropriate. In 
the end, the judge is responsible for any decision made and should be permitted to take steps to ensure that 
there is an adequate evidentiary foundation for any decision that cannot be avoided on evidentiary or other 
grounds by a non-suit. Further discussion of these issues is needed to compare cases arising in a family or 
administrative law context with civil law cases dealing with tort liability or contract claims, for example. 
24 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 17. 
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soundly-reasoned, and more likely to address concerns and perspectives raised by the 
parties and the broader community, and less likely to have unintended collateral 
effects on non-parties.25   
 
 
(C) Hearing with oral submissions and argument to assist judge in finalizing the 
 reasons for decision 
 
 Following the exchange of written submissions critiquing the reasons for 
decision, either the judge or one or both of the parties might take the position that a 
hearing is needed. A judge who determines that a hearing would be of assistance to 
her in finalizing the reasons for decision should not hesitate to hold one. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
These proposals for critiques and commentary on the draft findings of fact and the 
draft reasons for decision are intended to nurture and build on the creative 
collaborative potential of critique and dialogue between the judge and counsel. The 
proposals require counsel to engage in further work in order to assist the judge with 
multiple aspects of the decision-making task, while reserving ultimate responsibility 
for the final decision to the judge. The general working proposition is that judges and 
other decision-makers must be prepared to adjust procedures and practices in a 
flexible manner as needed to facilitate effective communication. The substantive 
challenges of individual cases must be permitted to shape procedure. Procedure and 
practice is a means to justice, not an end in itself, and must not be permitted to 
preclude steps and initiatives required to fulfill the objectives of the justice process, 
subject to constitutional protections. 
 
 
Arms-length critics or legitects  
 
     Diversity on the bench clearly strengthens the capacity of the judiciary to 
engage in debate that reflects a range of perspectives and experience. A further 
                                                 
25 Where a decision changes the interpretation or application of a law, it is arguably only appropriate that 
interested non-parties have an opportunity to intervene for the purposes of making submissions. But it will 
often not be feasible for non-parties to do so because interventions require planning and legal 
representation. Organizations are more likely to be in a position to seek intervener status than individuals 
are, but even a financially well-endowed organization is unlikely to have the institutional capacity 
required to intervene effectively in more than a few carefully selected cases. Only if the precedent system 
were discontinued prospectively, such that the decision in each case would affect only that case, and all 
changes in the law came about by a legislative or rule and policy-making process, would interveners cease 
to have a role in judicial proceedings in individual cases. Individuals and organizations would then 
influence law-making and law reform, rule, regulation, and policy development through processes 
designed to facilitate citizen ‘input’ (submissions to the decision-maker(s)) or ‘direct participation’ 
(decision-making role assumed by citizens generally or a community citizens board or panel). 
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option is the use of arms-length non-peer critics employed by the courts to assist 
judges much as clerks do. These critics would be individuals with legal training and 
training in “legitecture”26 who would review and comment on legal decisions and 
reasons for decision by administrators and judges and monitor the operation and 
effects of the rules of courts with a view to strengthening the overall quality of legal 
deliberation by judges and administrative decision-makers.27 A court system or 
administrative agency could also establish a separate division of legitects, 
independent from the bench or hearing panel to act as intervener critics in legal 
proceedings on a non-partisan basis for the purpose of enhancing the quality of fact-
finding and deliberation. Legitects might also be retained by individuals and groups 
in the community to assist with case development and litigation strategy, including 
the collection and analysis of evidence. Meaningful access to justice within a 
constitutional framework under current social and political conditions requires the 
proficient exercise of skills and knowledge in legal analysis and deliberation in 
relation to diverse subject matters in a social and cultural environment that is 
characterized by differences in interpretation and significance. Decision-makers, 
including citizens, administrators, or trial or appellate judges, could all benefit from 
being able to call on the assistance of well-trained legitects.28 
 
 
Institutionalization of these critical functions would acknowledge their 
value as a means to ensure the attainment of high standards in decision-
making.  A secondary effect would be to affirm, as a matter of general 
                                                 
26 Vandervort, supra note 6, where a new discipline of “legitecture” as “the theory and practice of 
institutional legal design” is proposed and discussed. There it is suggested that: “A basic legitecture 
program would include training in law and legal theory, critical reasoning, logic, rhetoric, communication 
theory, phenomenological theory and methods, epistemology, ethics and value theory, psychology, 
political theory, policy analysis, statistics, and qualitative and quantitative research methods. Specialists 
would, in addition, be trained in one or more substantive disciplines and demonstrate competence in 
critical analysis and empirical research using mixed methods in specific area(s) of specialization,” ibid, n 
18.  
27 Expanded in-house court resources for specialized non-legal research and analysis could be one 
response to questions raised about the use of expert opinion evidence in Anderson v St. Jude Medical 
Inc.,[2011] OJ No 1956 by John Chapman & Adam Stephens, “Professor, Take the Stand: Class 
proceedings may require a re-thinking of evidentiary rules” Lawyers Weekly, 14 October 2011 at 9. 
Courts, especially specialized tribunals that repeatedly confront certain specific issues in the cases they 
hear, may require such resources to strengthen their rule and policy-making capacities. Such issues arise 
frequently in the law of evidence at present. A strong research and rule and policy development capacity 
could also be useful whenever the governing statute, if any, is worded in general terms and few 
regulations have been promulgated, effectively delegating the “regulatory” task to the judiciary. In the 
family law area, for example, the regulatory task is, for the most part, effectively delegated to the courts. 
Detailed and specific criteria such as those provided by the Child Support Guidelines, are rare. An 
expansion of in-house court resources for research and analysis would support collegial judicial initiatives 
undertaken to address recurring and emerging issues in a systematic fashion. 
28 Following the recent decision in Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 
SCC 44 [Insite] courts and potential litigants will clearly continue to require the assistance of persons who 
are capable of collecting and analyzing evidence of the effects of laws and state action, including the 
exercise of discretion by government, on Charter-protected rights.        
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principle, that initiatives and innovations designed to improve the quality 
of legal decisions and decision-making are legitimate and appropriate.29  
 
 
Development of the discipline of “legitecture” and a cadre of “legitects” would also 
strengthen the collective societal capacity to generate systemic responses and 
solutions to institutional design problems that impede meaningful access to justice at 
present.30 This would advance the public interest in the administration of justice. 
 
 
Written reasons 
 
Thus far in this discussion the tacit assumption has been that reasons shall be 
given for decisions, declarations, orders, etc., and it has been further assumed that 
these reasons shall be in writing, not merely delivered orally. That assumption would 
likely to be rejected by many decision-makers as impractical given the time and 
effort required to draft written reasons. Oral reasons, recorded on audio tape are an 
acceptable alternative if they are also transcribed. Either will suffice, but in all cases 
there should be a written record of the decision and reasons for the decision that is 
readily accessible by the public. This is imperative to provide a comprehensive 
record of individual decisions and the reasoning process relied on to justify them. 
Without records of decisions and reasons for decision that are readily accessible to 
the public, government, journalists, academics, judicial councils, and court 
administrators, the particulars of the day-to-day administration of justice are shielded 
from effective scrutiny. This makes it more difficult to determine how law affects 
society, what the effects of our laws as interpreted and applied are, how effective 
specific laws are as tools to achieve the objectives they were designed to advance, 
whether a law has unanticipated adverse effects, is ambiguous, over-broad, under-
inclusive, and whether and in what respects it requires restatement or reform. When 
there are no accessible written reasons, the public is largely dependent on journalists’ 
reports about both the proceedings and the outcome, including any oral reasons 
                                                 
29 Vandervort, supra note 6 at 18. 
 
30 C.f. Trebilcock, supra note 4 at 81-82. The observations by Professor Trebilcock: “The general body of 
citizens of Ontario is entitled to assurances that legal aid resources are being expended to facilitate the 
smoother, more timely, and more effective resolution of disputes, rather than the opposite - underwriting 
seemingly interminable wars of attrition that may appeal to some lawyers, but to almost nobody else. 
Moreover, they have legitimate cause to ask why costly legal aid resources are being used to prop up and 
sustain underlying dysfunctions in the justice system and in some cases to exacerbate them, rather than 
deploying those same resources to repair those dysfunctions at their foundations. In their daily economic 
and social environments, they are expected to adjust to ever more rapid processes of change, and they 
wonder why the justice system seems largely impervious to similar processes of change but instead, in 
their perception, resembles some baroque institutional period-piece from a by-gone age. I believe that 
these attitudes should be taken seriously, because they are largely true. The implications for reform of the 
legal aid system are that such reforms must be seen as part of a broader project of progressive and 
incremental reform of the justice system at large.” 
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delivered in open court. Journalists are understandably selective in their reporting 
and the information they transmit is not raw data; it has already been interpreted. 
Transcripts of court proceedings are expensive and few court proceedings are well-
attended by the public. Oral reasons are typically recorded on audio tape but not 
transcribed unless counsel for one of the parties requests that this be done, often only 
in contemplation of a possible appeal. 
 
 
Reasons for decision are essential when an individual seeks judicial review or 
appeals a decision, but they are also essential at a systemic level to enhance the 
general accountability of decision-makers and administrators of the legal system to 
the public and to facilitate internal and external scrutiny of the administration of 
justice. Written and accessible reasons for all judicial and administrative decisions 
would be invaluable as a resource to secure a new, more concrete, and therefore 
more meaningful level of accountability to the public, quite independent from the 
benefits that may accrue to the parties in specific cases. At present, the practical 
inaccessibility of the reasons for many judicial and administrative decisions impedes 
public knowledge, scrutiny, and criticism of the actual functioning of the 
administration of justice. This is contrary to the public interest. The absence of 
effective accountability mechanisms is anomalous in a system of self-government 
based on the rule of law. 
 
 
Reporting the reasons on settlement of a decision, declaration, or order 
 
No one knows how often Canadian justice ‘mumbles’ or speaks in ambiguous terms 
with the result that the wording of a decision, declaration, or order fails to address or 
lacks clarity with respect to one or more issues that are crucial for its interpretation 
and enforcement. Sometimes the reasons for the decision provide necessary and 
sufficient clarification. When counsel for the parties can amicably agree on an 
interpretation and wording for the order in question and there is no risk of future 
uncertainty because of the ambiguity, no further formal steps are required or apt to 
be taken before the order is entered. When this is not the case because the reasons for 
decision or judgment do not address the issue, the parties may find it necessary to 
request a further hearing before the judge to resolve the ambiguity and settle the 
wording. On occasion, comments by the judge at this further hearing reveal for the 
very first time that the judge is not aware of or does not fully understand crucial 
elements of the evidence in the case or the relevant law or both.  Clearly this is an 
extremely unfortunate and potentially awkward situation and a cause for concern at 
the systemic level. In an ideal world, the judge would use the settlement hearing to 
sort out the outstanding issues, clearly and correctly, and vary the order as necessary; 
this is not an ideal world and that may not occur for a variety of reasons. In all cases, 
any supplementary reasons delivered on settlement should be transcribed and 
reported, or otherwise made available to the public, together with the original reasons 
for decision or judgment. This is necessary to provide an accurate representation of 
the practical outcome and, with that, a type of public accountability that does not 
20
12
 C
an
LI
ID
oc
s 
60
[2012] ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 143 
 
 
exist at present in relation to many judicial decisions.31 Lack of access to this 
material by court administrators, researchers, government, etc., distorts the public’s 
knowledge about the actual effects of current law, as applied, and shields a key 
aspect of the administration of justice from scrutiny. 
 
 
 Where an ambiguous and contradictory outcome is the result of an extended 
and expensive trial, it is unlikely that the parties will see themselves as 
“beneficiaries” of the “access to justice” they were accorded or be left with much 
trust in the judicial process. The practical consequences for the parties can be 
extremely dire where the effects of the decision are irrevocable or the parties are 
individuals of modest financial means. In the first case an appeal is pointless; in the 
second it is usually too expensive for the parties to even consider. In any event, an 
appeal in such a case could well be hindered by the state of the record, and might 
well result in an order for a new trial: again, hardly affordable by the parties in most 
cases. Regrettably, such outcomes do occur and are arguably symptomatic of the 
dysfunction that can result at present using current trial practices and procedures. 
 
 
 No party who is left with a decision that fails to address the central practical 
issues in the case in a legally correct and coherent manner will agree that their case 
was “heard” in any meaningful sense. Such outcomes raise serious questions about 
the quality of justice rendered by the judicial process, bring courts and judges into 
disrepute in the community, and explain why some people in Canada lack confidence 
in the justice system and simply avoid both lawyers and courts if at all possible. The 
problem appears to arise from poor communication with the judge in the course of 
legal proceedings; it could be significantly reduced, if not completely eliminated, by 
use of the proposals set out above providing for release by the judge of draft findings 
of fact and draft reasons for decision, the exchange of further submissions, and an 
opportunity for a further hearing and expanded dialogue between the judge and 
                                                 
31 Reasons on settlement of orders are not routinely reported or otherwise made readily accessible by the 
public although they may be transcribed where they are required to perfect an appeal. The absence of 
reported reasons on settlement makes it difficult, at present, for researchers to ascertain the incidence and 
extent of disparities between what the law, correctly applied, provides, given the findings of fact and the 
judgment, and the practical effect of the final order in some cases. Ironically, at present a case may be 
used as a precedent based on the original reasons for judgment as reported even though the practical effect 
of the order as settled is quite different. No one knows how often there is ambiguity on crucial points, or 
inconsistency between the original reasons for decision or judgment and the practical effects of the final 
order as settled. In the future, hopefully, researchers may find it possible to examine examples related to 
specific cases and discuss the factors that adversely affected the legal process. Here it is possible only to 
raise these questions. It should be apparent, however, that within the framework of current trial procedure 
and practice, choices made in the conduct of the proceedings by counsel, the judge, or both, may 
contribute to clarity or confusion about the law, the evidence, and the practical import of the decision. 
Most readers with experience on either side of the bar will be aware of instances to which these comments 
apply.    
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counsel. In all instances, it should be incumbent on counsel to take affirmative steps 
to provide the presiding judge with genuine assistance.32 
        
 
CONCLUSION 
   
Many judges and legal professionals agree that the old ways of doing justice are not 
adequate to meet current challenges. Some would say that the legal system is in a 
state of crisis, if not worse. In any event, the challenges are quite real and some 
systemic and fundamental changes in how the legal system does justice appear to be 
needed. In particular, this essay has argued that judges and other judicial, quasi-
judicial, and administrative decision-makers must be entitled, and seen to be entitled 
to all the resources and institutional structures and supports they require to fulfill 
their responsibilities to an appropriately high standard. The public interest in the 
administration of justice is not and cannot be truly well-served under the present 
arrangements. This is not acceptable; inaction is not an option.     
 
                                                 
32 Assignment of cases to judges who have some expertise in dealing with the issues raised may be useful, 
but that is no substitute for a process that is effective to ensure that the presiding judge actually 
understands the evidence, the law, and the submissions of counsel in the case at bar. 
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